Baltic states boost security measures in face of Russian aggression - but efforts are plagued by misinformation

At the moment of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO's defense plan for the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in a similar scenario was primarily based on tripwire forces, deploying small, multinational battlegroups in each country. These groups aimed to delay an assault and indicate to an enemy that NATO reinforcements were en route. 

Given such unpreparedness, alarmist claims began to circulate on social media, such as the allegation that NATO would need up to 180 days to mobilize sufficient forces to defend the Baltic states in the event of a Russian attack. Estonian then-Prime Minister Kaja Kallas reflected these concerns in 2022, critiquing existing plans and voicing fears they might allow the Baltic states to be overrun.

While NATO has made substantial advancements to address these concerns, including a sevenfold increase in high-readiness troops following the 2023 Vilnius summit, Baltic nations have also taken matters into their own hands. All three have heavily bolstered defense spending. Estonia raised its defense budget to 3.2 percent of GDP for 2024, the highest in its history, which may be paid for through a security levy on civilians. Latvia has constructed almost 145 kilometers of border fencing along its boundary with Belarus in an effort to counter a spike in illegal crossings, categorized as a Russian hybrid warfare tactic by the country's internal affairs minister. Lithuania is spending €467.7 million on new weaponry and military equipment and bolstering border security due to fears over the presence of Wagner mercenaries in Belarus.

While ambitious, such plans have faced major logistical and operational challenges. The region has also been plagued by misinformation and disinformation campaigns, primarily orchestrated by Russian state actors and their Baltic sympathizers, aimed at undermining public confidence in the region and NATO's capabilities to defend it.

The disaster of Rail Baltica

The Baltic states face two interconnected hurdles to military readiness: the availability of infrastructure to transport troops and goods to strategic locations and the funding of such projects. Current infrastructure, especially the rail system, remains largely incompatible with Western European standards.

Rail Baltica is one such example—an ambitious rail network spanning 870 kilometers between Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and, indirectly, Finland. Although the project was announced in 2017, its urgent completion has gained new significance in the face of Russia's security threat. Designed for both civilian and military use, the project aims to integrate the Baltics with EU infrastructure and bolster NATO's eastern defense. 

However, the project has faced scrutiny based on four concerns: it is being rushed, excessively costly, shrouded in secrecy, and harmful to the environment. Latvia has faced the harshest financial critique, as costs have ballooned from 2 billion euros in 2017 to 9.5 billion euros in 2024, prompting suspicions of corruption. These allegations have been propagated by controversial former diplomat and leader of the populist party Alliance of Young Latvians (Apvienība Jaunlatvieši) Rūdolfs Brēmanis, who described it as a "racketeering project" and falsely suggested that the debate over compulsory military service for young women in Latvia was introduced as a diversion from the Rail Baltica controversy.

In Estonia, some claim that the railway is a covert means to start mining and transporting phosphorite and shale gas (see here). This theory, pushed by far-right politicians like Kalle Grünthal (see here), suggests that foreign companies, rather than the Baltic states, would economically exploit the infrastructure and resources. Others argue the project aims to bankrupt the country, allowing the World Bank to intervene and undermine democracy (see here). These accusations fuel the narrative that Rail Baltica is more about serving foreign interests than benefiting local populations, but they are unsubstantiated. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania publicly own Rail Baltica, which benefits primarily from passenger transport and environmental improvements. An official report confirms the project's economic viability, projecting a net benefit of 6.6 billion EUR and a GDP boost 0.5-0.7 percent.

The planned route of the Rail Baltica project. (Source: Rail Baltica/LinkedIn)

Disinformation and the Baltic Sea

Alongside overland routes, securing the Baltic Sea is also a key consideration. While NATO has increased its naval presence, the region faces targeted disinformation campaigns. These efforts, spread through Russian state media, aim to undermine Baltic maritime security and NATO's presence. 

"Russia seeks to counterbalance its position in the region through various information operations," Andreas Ventsel, a professor of political and socio-semiotics at Estonia's Tartu University, told Logically Facts. "These operations typically pursue two main strategies: portraying Russia as stronger and its adversaries as weaker than they may actually be."

For example, in April 2023 the Estonian newspaper Eesti Päevaleht uncovered "the Baltic Platform," a planned disinformation campaign designed to incite anti-NATO sentiment in the Baltic states. The first stage of the campaign included the stoking of discourse around the Baltic Sea, including pushing narratives around the potential environmental impact of the Nord Stream pipeline explosion through Russian state media — an explosion Russia blames on Ukraine. However, these disinformation campaigns have not proved successful, as the Baltics are highly aware of Russian influence operations.

Alongside Russian disinformation, domestic misinformation and unverified claims in relation to the Baltic Sea have also circulated. In October 2023, Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs made a controversial proposal regarding Baltic security, suggesting that NATO should close the Baltic Sea to Russian ships in response to unverified claims of damage to the Balticconnector gas pipeline — a move experts warned that could escalate tensions. In reaction to the damage to subsea infrastructure, NATO increased its patrols over the Baltic Sea. 

However, the situation saw a recent shift when China admitted it was responsible for the pipeline damage, claiming it was an accident caused by a storm. Such an incident underscores the existing tensions in the region, highlighting how even a minor miscalculation or a military decision based on unverified information could lead to significant escalation despite lacking a factual basis.

Lithuania also saw an increase in misinformation concerning the Baltic Sea in connection with the Nord Stream pipeline explosions. One narrative by controversial political activist Eduardas Vaitkus claimed that Russia was not allowed to participate in the investigation of the Nord Stream incident, suggesting that this exclusion points to a cover-up by European nations. However, the claim that Russia was unfairly excluded is misleading. Coordinated investigations into the Nord Stream explosions were conducted by Sweden and Denmark, with support from Germany — standard practice given that the incidents occurred within the economic zones of Sweden and Denmark. Both investigations concluded that the explosions were caused by powerful underwater detonations but did not explicitly attribute blame to any state actor.

A map of the Baltic Sea Region with Political Borders. (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Paying the price

Alongside the logistical challenges of bolstering Baltic security, the funding to address such concerns has stirred considerable debate and criticism across all three nations. In Estonia, public sentiment is increasingly wary of the costs associated with Russia's war, with some critics proclaiming that the country is already overburdened by its financial commitments to Ukraine and assume that supporting a security tax will translate to further financial support. Some opposition politicians also claim the tax is merely a way to address the government's budget deficit rather than genuine defense costs.

Others such as Aivo Peterson, a candidate in the last European Union elections, have accused Zelenskyy's regime of being involved in money laundering (see here). These doubts are often fueled by unfounded claims about the wealth of the Ukrainian President, which aim to undermine trust in his leadership and question the legitimacy of international aid. Logically Facts has previously debunked multiple of those claims, including Zelenskyy buying a casino resort, posing with bundles of cash, and his wife purchasing a Bugatti with taxpayer money. Though unsubstantiated, Peterson's criticism resonates with those frustrated by the economic sacrifices for a war they feel isn't theirs.

Similarly, Latvia has faced scrutiny over its own military investments, such as the Selonia Training Area development project, which includes improvements to troop accommodation, training facilities, and transportation networks. "Another project to plunder millions from Latvia is launched - the Selonia project," Jānis Dzenis, a member of the party Alliance of Young Latvians (Apvienība Jaunlatvieši), posted on Facebook.

In Lithuania, comparable debates have arisen regarding the construction of the largest military infrastructure in the country's history at the Rūdninkai Training Area. The project will serve as a base for a German brigade under NATO's Forward Presence. While the project is vital for NATO's defense strategy, some claim that the €125 million investment could strain the national budget and potentially divert resources from other critical areas like social services. 

The parties responsible

In the Baltic states, politicians frequently stand as the most influential spreaders of misinformation, manipulating public opinion to advance their political agendas. Some aim to undermine NATO, while others promote pro-Russian narratives or question the legitimacy of EU directives. Given their substantial reach and authority, the impact of politicians' statements, whether false or true, is profound.

"In our region, the primary targets of misinformation are those issues that are most relevant to us, such as Russia's war against Ukraine and misinformation related to local realities and processes," Viktor Denisenko, Associate Professor at the Center for Journalism and Media Research of Lithuania, told Logically Facts.

In Estonia, far-right politicians like Kalle Grünthal and Martin Helme fuel skepticism about Rail Baltica and the national security tax, framing these initiatives as misguided and detrimental. Meanwhile, Aivo Peterson, currently under trial for treason, has established the Koos (transl: Together) party, known for spreading misinformation about NATO, undermining the legitimacy of the Russo-Ukrainian war, and criticizing the government for taking a definitive for-and-against stance in this conflict. Their members include four convicted murderers, three rapists, and drug traffickers. 

Latvia faces its own challenges, with Brēmanis and artist Kaspars Dimiters leveraging their platforms to propagate misleading narratives. The latter recently released a musical album in Russian with themes of war and unity. It was revealed that the release of his album was sponsored by the Fund for the Protection and Support of Compatriots Living Abroad, under the responsibility of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In Lithuania, there is growing concern about whether an overt pro-Russian political party could be formed, stemming from the recent performance of Eduardas Vaitkus, who received over seven percent of the vote in the 2024 presidential election. Vaitkus has repeatedly accused the Lithuanian government of inflaming tensions with Russia through its close alignment with NATO and support for Ukraine. He suggests that Lithuania's pro-Western stance is not in the national interest but is instead a dangerous path that could lead to war.

"During the Cold War, the Soviet Union's propaganda apparatus always had a network of sympathizers in the West who would echo certain narratives useful to the Soviets. The strategy has not changed, only now those politicians can be on the left or the right. It doesn't matter what their agenda is, as long as it aligns with the Kremlin's interests," political scientist Nerijus Maliukevičius explained to Logically Facts.

A recent investigation also revealed that Viktor Uspaskichas, a Lithuanian MEP and the founder of the Lithuanian Labour Party, has been financially supporting 77.lt, a social media platform known for spreading conspiracy theories and pro-Russian disinformation. This platform, which has received over €200,000 in funding, is populated by fake profiles and is used to amplify narratives that align with Russian interests.

"The spread of misinformation is often facilitated by low media literacy and laziness, such as not verifying information or its sources," Denisenko said.

"Various fact-checking initiatives in the media, as well as NGO activities — both in establishing fact-checking initiatives and conducting training to improve media literacy — are critical in addressing this issue," he added.

Screenshot of a social media platform 77.lt. (Source: 77.lt/Screenshot)

Converging objectives

The Baltic states have made significant strides in strengthening their security infrastructure to address the evolving threats from Russian aggression. However, their efforts are complicated by distinct misinformation and disinformation campaigns driven by both domestic and foreign actors with occasionally overlapping goals.

Domestically, projects such as Rail Baltica have been targeted by local politicians spreading misinformation. These actors often exploit economic, environmental, or logistical concerns for political leverage, portraying the project as wasteful or strategically flawed. In contrast, disinformation aimed at maritime routes, particularly the Baltic Sea, is primarily orchestrated by Russia. This focus on the Baltic Sea is rooted in a strategic belief within Russian imperialist thought that controlling ports equates to controlling territory. This strategy is part of Russia's broader hybrid warfare tactics, including undermining NATO's influence by targeting physical infrastructure and public perception.

"The situation in the Baltic states is particularly distinct due to the significant Russian-speaking population, making the local audience potentially more susceptible to various forms of information manipulation," Ventsel told Logically Facts. "This is largely because propaganda often targets aspects crucial to identity, such as attempts to exacerbate tensions between the local population and the Russian-speaking community."

The domestic misinformation and Russian disinformation narratives sometimes converge when their objectives align. For example, both local politicians and Russian operatives have criticized Rail Baltica, albeit for different reasons. Domestic actors may focus on financial mismanagement or environmental impact, while Russian disinformation amplifies these criticisms to undermine NATO's strategic infrastructure by portraying the project as strategically vulnerable. 

Although the ongoing spread of misinformation continues to undermine public trust and complicate the initiatives, official and public efforts strive to mitigate its impact. Estonia plans to expand its cyber defense capabilities, and Latvia has approved a strategic communication unit within its Ministry of Defense. Meanwhile, Lithuania has focused on enhancing media literacy programs, equipping citizens with the tools to evaluate information sources critically. These initiatives reflect a broader, ongoing effort to protect their physical borders and the information landscape critical to national security.